1. What does Russell mean by
"sense data" and why does he introduce this notion?
When we experience an object there is a distinction
between appearance and reality. The object might look different in different
settings of light for example and angles. It will not look the same to two
different people observing the object at the same time because they don’t se it
from the same spot. This is the appearance, what the object appear to be to the
observers. It is not the reality shared by their experiences, because it differ.
Russell mean that the real object if it exists is not the same as what we
immediately experienced in sight, touch and hearing. Hence, two difficult
questions arise, does the object exist and if so, what kind of object can it
be? To consider these questions Russell introduced a few terms that are
definite and clear. Sense data is one of the terms that is immediately know in
sensations such as colors, sounds, smells and so on. And sensation is the
experience of being immediately aware of these things.
2. What is the meaning of the
terms "proposition" and "statement of fact"? How does
propositions and statement of facts differ from other kinds of verbal
expressions?
An example of statement of fact: Bishop Berkeley proved
that sense data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but
must be partly in the mind. Because their existence would not continue if there
were no seeing, hearing, touching, smelling or tasting. Which is derived from
grounds of the theory of knowledge. Which is conditions of how things must
satisfy in order that we may be able to know them. The statement by Berkeley is
proven through these facts from theory of knowledge.
A proposition is a complex philosophical expression of
meaning. In chapter 4 Berkley’s argument “whatever can be thought of is an idea
in the mind of the person thinking of it, therefore nothing can be thought of
except ideas in minds, therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is
inconceivable cannot exist“. Has been widely advanced by very many philosophers
(idealists) but is in Russell’s opinion fallacious. This argument is a
proposition because it has been widely advanced (accepted) without having a
statement of fact that proves the argument, a proposition.
3. In chapter 5 ("Knowledge
by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description") Russell introduces the
notion "definite description". What does this notion mean?
Objects which we are acquainted with that is not physical
objects or other people’s minds, are things known as “knowledge by description”
by Russell. It enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experiences.
Russell describes a “description” by, any phrase of the form “a so-and-so” or
“the so-and-so”. Thou the “a so-and-so” form are of ambiguous description since
they are not known by description. If “The so-and-so” phrase is in singular, it
is of definite description, and when having a certain property it is known by
description. For example: “The girl with red coat” (“The so-and-so”). While an
example of the ambiguous description (“a so-and-so”), would be: “a girl”.
4. In
chapter 13 ("Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion") and in
chapter 14 ("The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge") Russell
attacks traditional problems in theory of knowledge (epistemology). What
are the main points in Russell's presentation?
In chapter 13,
Russell argues that the question as to how we can know what is true and what is
false is of more interest than the question as to what is meant by truth and
falsehood, which is considered in the preceding chapter. He points out that
knowledge through erroneous beliefs still can be true. As one example from the
text, Russell describes that a man have the belief that the Prime ministers
last name starts with a B. The Prime ministers last name is Bannerman but the
man believes that Mr. Balfour is the name of Prime minister. This shows an
erroneous belief that turns up true with the first letter “B” in the last name.
This knowledge based on a “true belief” but deduced by a false belief enhances
Russells opinion that it’s more important to know how we can know what is true
and what is false.
In chapter 14
Russell analyzes claims made by philosophers, which they assert is possible to
prove through priori metaphysical reasoning. Examples of which he examines are:
fundamental dogmas of religion, essential rationality of the universe, the
illusoriness of matter and the unreality of evil. These (types) of reasoning are
missing pieces of the whole picture because the metaphysics can’t obtain
knowledge about the universe as a whole. Through the discussions about these
claims he indicates that there is philosophical limits to our understanding.
Although propositions are accepted by the large mass as somewhat of a "truth", Russel, as you state, believes Barkleys view on the matter is fallacious. Do you agree with him? For me at least "what is inconceivable cannot exist“ kind of falls upon itself since what is conceivable by be, could in fact be inconceivable by others, not because I bestow some rare power. But rather because I may have more knowledge about a specific concept and thus, I can conceive it. Do you agree with me?
SvaraRaderaYes i agree with him concerning the example with Barkleys of what is truth, well in every example you have yourself as a point a view and of course as you describe, what is conceivable or not to you depends on the knowledge you have, and everyone else have their knowledge as point of view. Therefore i interpret that you mean that "what is inconceivable cannot exist“ is described for the reality to each person. But you have to be able to prove to others why it is the "truth" with facts and be able to question everything. The person in a discussion that can't disprove you therefore should change their view if they understand your facts and can confirm them. I think the quotation "what is inconceivable cannot exist“ is not about each person, more described for "the best proven view".
Radera